Do Fukuyama’s arguments still hold today? Looking at the “package” (mentioned in Pt.1), there are indeed some challenges to it in which Fukuyama himself recognises, offering intriguing points of discussion.
First is the rise of Marxist-Communist China. The people in China obviously have a voice, but just not in the sense of free elections or the right to complain; there is a different combination of or approach to results and respect. A strong sense of nationalism is present throughout the Chinese population, and this channels respect, assertion, and the desire for dignity. Along with its unique technocratic and managerial styled regime, rapid material prosperity and economic growth are delivered. Interestingly, this way of politics and organisation has always been the default and dates back millennia, just like how Chinese emperors would have technocratic ministers chosen from harsh competitions and a series of examinations. For Fukuyama, this is a formidable combination, but not a satisfactory end of history combination. And yet he does comment that, if the described Chinese way still functions in 20 years, he might have to challenge his claims from 1989.
Another challenge is the advancement into the age of the internet where methods of receiving information and communication have been revolutionised. Such has greatly enhanced people’s ability to voice and solve problems and deliver benefits. Crucially, it has made some people better off (a few much better off) since the internet is basically free to use. This increased capacity can devise new systems and connections visible and invisible, going with our right to voice and express anger. Yet it can also pull apart the “package” that voice goes with respect since arguably: the more people express, the more they hate decisions taken for them; and the more variations of desired results there are, true delivery becomes harder. This presents a fundamental challenge to liberal democracy and its critical representative function.
How are current liberal democracies doing?
Looking at current liberal democratic institutions, Fukuyama is not particularly optimistic either. Relating to a previous idea, such systems feel a bit like the Japanese society stuck in the reeds of history. Politics of such form seems to be desperately clinging onto something they know works and has worked, but cannot quite work on what has gone wrong with it currently, and nor can they figure it out in order to reform it. Therefore, the current liberal democratic politics tries to package itself up eagerly as it knows it is more fragile than people know.
There is always the option of choosing an alternative system to regroup and move on, but no one dares to do so, and nor is there sufficient courage. But more importantly, the current status of such politics is seemingly not a good resting place for which something new can be set up, thus not suitable for the end of history.
For this problem, Fukuyama has constantly warned about the US simply because its institution may no longer be fit for the end of history as it is firmly stuck whilst never being allowed to change. The term “vetocracy” is used herein in the American context: it is extremely easy to voice something in US society, but nothing significant actually happens. In my first post (regarding Tocqueville’s work on America), the idea of “surface volatility” was mentioned and this is exactly what is occurring -- too many voices, partisanship, polarisation with each side accusing the other has generated many deadlocks with not much delivery. For example, in the impeachment trials (of Trump), everyone basically knew the outcome, yet there was still so much noise. Returning to Fukuyama’s “package”, this noisiness will drown out liberal democracy as voicing one’s opinion no longer (or at least currently) leads to dignity, respect and delivery. Not sustainable.
As noted, Fukuyama’s notion of the “End of History” does not mean the end of the human journey, but something new of the human journey may arrive. Yet now, it does not seem this supposed endpoint is in any way foreseeable. Liberal democratic institutions are all heading in the same direction (but just some faster than others), facing the serious problem of being stuck in the reeds of history, whilst supposed alternatives like that of a Chinese system does not yet hold strong. Both do not fulfil the “package”, meaning that the end of history is nowhere near.
History is the story of human agency and it is what we human beings make of the world. It shows our capacity to achieve, but also the destructive potential.
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